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ABSTRACT
Event-based systems lie at the heart of many cloud-based Internet-
of-Things (IoT) platforms. This combination of the Broker architec-
tural style and the Publisher-Subscriber design pattern provides a
way for smart devices to communicate and coordinate with one an-
other. The present design of these cloud-based IoT frameworks lacks
measures to (i) protect devices against malicious cloud disconnec-
tions, (ii) impose information flow control among communicating
parties, and (iii) enforce coordination protocols in the presence of
compromised devices. In this work, we propose to extend the mod-
ular event-based system architecture of Fiege et al., to incorporate
brokering policies and execution monitors, in order to address the
three protection challenges mentioned above. We formalized the
operational semantics of our protection scheme, explored how the
scheme can be used to enforce BLP-style information flow control
and RBAC-style protection domains, implemented the proposal
in an open-source MQTT broker, and evaluated the performance
impact of the protection mechanisms.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is envisioned to be a massively dis-
tributed system of smart devices, each potentially equipped with
physical sensors and actuators. This is, however, not the first day we
develop distributed systems. Decades of experiences in architecting
distributed systems have gone into the design of IoT frameworks.
Specifically, the Broker architectural style has been employed to
coordinate the communication between devices, so that the idiosyn-
crasies of low-level network communications can be abstracted
away [11]. The Publisher-Subscriber design pattern has been ap-
plied to prevent the need for polling the state of collaborating
devices, and to provide decoupling between message senders and
receivers [11]. In this work, we use the term event-based systems
to refer to this combination of Broker and Publisher-Subscriber
[20]. Many existing IoT frameworks are essentially variants of
event-based systems. The MQTT protocol, a messaging transport
protocol widely used in popular IoT frameworks (including that of
IBM, Amazon, and Microsoft), is an example of such a design [15].
The implementation of event-based systems in the context of
commercial IoT frameworks, however, has a twist, and that is the
centralization of the notification mechanism on a cloud platform.
This is understandable as a cloud-based implementation offers the
benefit of low configuration and maintenance cost.
The motivation of this work is to inquire about what unique
protection challenges are presented in the cloud-based realization
of event-based systems, and to devise protection mechanisms and
access control technologies for addressing them. We discern three
protection challenges.
(1) Clouddisconnection. Previouswork has argued that a cloud-
based implementation of an IoT coordination framework could be
susceptible to cloud disconnection [14]. That is, the cloud could
be disconnected because it has fallen victim to a DDoS attack, or
the ISP becomes unavailable because of an Internet-scale incident,
or the physical connection to the cloud is maliciously severed.
(2) Information flow control. Some of themessages exchanged
by devices are sensitive. The nature of a Publisher-Subscriber sys-
tem is that the two parties of communication need not know one
another. Such decoupling must be complemented by proper infor-
mation flow control in order that messages are not accidentally
received by unintended parties. This need for privacy and confiden-
tiality is particularly relevant in the era of ubiquitous deployment
of sensors, which collect personal information from health data to
what goes on in the bedroom.
(3) Enforcing coordination protocols. Smart devices are lim-
ited in capability, and thus they are easy targets for malicious ex-
ploits. Yet these devices are now part of our safety infrastructure.
An example is to have the smoke detector shut down the furnace
in the event of a fire. If these devices are compromised, then the
coordination logic that we rely on to ensure safety will no longer be
carried out properly. It is therefore important to build measures into
the event-based systems so that any deviations from coordination
protocols can be detected, and, if possible, compensated for.
This work proposes a unified protection scheme that addresses
the aforementioned challenges in event-based systems. More specif-
ically, the following are our contributions.
(1) We adopted the modular event-based system of Fiege et al
[18–20, 31], which is made up of multiple communicating brokers,
to mitigate the impact of cloud disconnection (§3). More impor-
tantly, we extended their work, and introduced the ideas of impos-
ing brokering policies to control the flow of information among
brokers and devices (§4.1), and interposing execution monitors
along network links to enforce coordination protocols (§4.2). We
demonstrated the utility of our proposal in a case study that shows
how the proposed protection mechanisms can be deployed to pro-
tect a smart home (§4.3).
(2) We formalized the operational semantics of our protection
scheme in the form of a state transition model (§5). This lays the
foundation for the study of policy enforceability in the context of
event-based systems.
(3) We devised a number of usage patterns that allow one to im-
pose BLP-style information flow control and RBAC-style protection
domains in the context of an event-based system (§6).
(4) We implemented the proposed protection scheme inMosquitto,
an open-source MQTT broker (§7), and evaluated the performance
impact of the proposed protection mechanisms (§8).
2 RELATEDWORK
This work builds on the modular event-based system architecture
of Fiege et al. [18–20, 31], but moves significantly beyond it. The
adoption of multiple brokers is no longer motivated by modularity,
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but for anticipating cloud disconnection. Brokering policies are gen-
eralization of the Fiege et al. scoping rule (§3). Execution monitors
are generalization of event filters and mappers (§6.2).
Cloud disconnection is addressed in [14] by having a local hub
that replicates the coordination scripts that are stored in the cloud.
Our work can be seen as a more principled and general way to
localize coordination logics. Virtual objects are software shadows
of physical devices [6, 7]. Having virtual objects hosted in the cloud
partly addresses the problem of occasional cloud disconnections,
but this does not guarantee the proper functioning of coordination
logics when the cloud is disconnected. Pushing security enforce-
ment towards the edge of the network is a general trend [32, 38].
Our work provides a general architecture for hosting safety-related
coordination logics at the edge in anticipation of cloud disconnec-
tion.
There has been growing interests in applying Attribute-Based
Access Control (ABAC) [25] in the context of IoT in general, and
event-based systems in particular [12, 23, 33, 37]. Our work is com-
plementary. For example, ABAC can be deployed to control which
devices can be connected to the various brokers in a broker ensem-
ble. Each broker plays the role of a protection domain. Information
flow control (§6.1.1) and history-tracking execution monitors (§4.2)
can then be employed to control the routing and transformation
of events among protection domains (brokers). This is the setup
envisioned in §6.2.3. Note that when we use the RBAC terminology
of [10] in §6.2.3, we are not sanctioning RBAC for IoT. The so-called
“roles” are but protection domains.
Also relevant to this work are attempts to add content-based
access control to MQTT [12]. A technical challenge is to meet the
hungry throughput demand of IoT applications. Our implementa-
tion of history-tracking execution monitors is a first step towards
realizing high-throughput, content-based event processing in a
messaging system (§7–8).
3 BACKGROUND: MULTIPLE BROKERS
Distributed Event-Based Systems. A popular system architecture
for IoT applications is to have devices connected to a cloud-based
broker. Typically a device signals a change of its state by publish-
ing a message, also known as a event, through the broker. Each
event is typically annotated with an event topic, which is a tag
that allows the broker to quickly classify events for the purpose
of message delivery. Devices may also declare to the broker what
event topics they are interested in. This declaration of interest is
also known as a subscription. On receiving an event published
under a certain event topic, the broker will notify all the devices
that have previously subscribed to that event topic. The rationale
for adopting such an architecture in a distributed system is so that
devices are decoupled from one another: the publisher does not
need to knowwho will end up receiving a message, and a subscriber
does not need to know from where the event originates. The broker
is the only one who needs to know the network addresses of the
communicating parties. In addition, subscription-based notifica-
tion eliminates the need for periodic polling. This architectural
design, in which the broker architecture style is combined with
the publisher-subscriber design pattern [11], is known in the
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Figure 1: A sample hierarchy of brokers and devices. Ovals
represent brokers, while boxes represent devices.
literature as an event-based system [20]. MQTT, a popular mes-
saging transport protocol designed for IoT applications, is a typical
instantiation of this system architecture [9].
CloudDisconnection. Previouswork has argued that an IoT frame-
work that is built around a centralized, cloud-based broker is suscep-
tible to cloud disconnection [14]. The latter could be caused by, for
example, the cloud infrastructure becoming the victim of a DDoS
attack, the network infrastructure of an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) being affected by an internet outage event, or a malicious
party physically severing the connection between the devices and
the cloud-based broker. Such disconnections could have physical
safety implications. For example, the cloud-based broker typically
hosts coordination logics that notify one device when the state of
another device changes. Such coordination logics could very well
be part of the measures for ensuring physical safety: e.g., notify
homeowner in case of break-in, shutdown furnace in case smoke
is detected, unlock door for helper in case an elderly occupant is
found to have fallen on the ground, etc. If the cloud is maliciously
disconnected, then the coordination logics hosted on the cloud
will not be executed. This could have potentially serious safety
implications.
Enter Multiple Brokers. To anticipate cloud disconnection, pre-
vious work has argued that redundancy must be built into an IoT
framework [14]. In other words, it is desirable to ensure that coordi-
nation logics are still executed in the event of cloud disconnection.
The modular event-based system architecture of Fiege et al. [18–
20, 31] provides a good starting point for anticipating cloud discon-
nection. The system design of Fiege was originally proposed for
the sake of modularizing distributed event-based systems, in this
work we reappropriate their design for building resiliency into an
IoT framework so as to mitigate the impact of cloud disconnection.
Ultimately, we will move beyond their proposal (see §4).
In the system architecture of Fiege et al., there are multiple
brokers connected to one another through network connections.
When a device publishes an event to a broker, the latter does not
only notify the subscriber devices who are connected directly to
itself, but also passes the event to its neighbouring brokers. This
propagation of message publication is further regulated by two
mechanisms.
(1) The design goal of Fiege et al. is to provide modularity in the
construction of distributed systems. Consequently, they envisioned
that each broker is the physical embodiment of a namespace of
events. Recall that namespace management is the classical means
for adding modularity to a programming language environment. In-
fluenced by this programming language root, Fiege el al. called these
namespaces scopes. To support nested scoping (as in a structured
programming language), they did two things. First, they organized
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the brokers into a hierarchy. Second, they imposed a scoping rule
on the propagation of events from one broker to another.
The Fiege et al. Scoping Rule. An event published in a broker x
is visible to the subscribers in broker y only if there exists a
broker z that is a common ancestor of both x and y in the broker
hierarchy. A degenerate case is when z is either x or y.
For example, in Fig. 1, an event published by device 1 to broker C
will be visible to subscriber 2 under broker C and also subscriber 3
under broker D. The latter case is justified by A being a common
ancestor of C and D. On the contrary, subscribers under broker E
will not be notified, as E does not share a common ancestor with C .
The scoping rule above can be implemented by a simple modifica-
tion to the broker. In particular, if an event is propagated to a broker
x from one of its parents, then x will not propagate the event to its
other parents. For example, in Fig. 1, broker D will not propagate
to parent broker B those events received from parent broker A.
(2) To push the scoping metaphor further, Fiege et al. also intro-
duced event filtering and event mapping into the event propaga-
tion mechanism. Event filtering refers to a mechanism that allows
the system architect to specify that events of certain topics are not
permitted to be propagated along a network connection linking one
broker to another. This promotes encapsulation, and thus allows
certain event topics to become private within a scope (i.e., a broker).
Event mapping refers to a mechanism that allows the system ar-
chitect to specify how event topics are “renamed” (to other topics)
as they pass through a network connection linking one broker to
another. This further promotes encapsulation.
The introduction of multiple brokers offers a good starting point
for anticipating cloud disconnection. For example, in Fig. 1, if broker
A is disconnected, then other brokers can still perform local prop-
agation of events. We envision that brokers are organized based
on their network proximity to the devices. For example, a local
hub can connect devices belonging to the same local area network.
Then an ISP may host a broker for each geographical region it
serves. Such a broker will be the parent of the local hubs. A cloud
service provider then provides a top-level broker, with ISP brokers
as children. Other intermediate level brokers can be introduced as
needed (e.g., brokers mirroring organizational divisions). Coordina-
tion logics hosted at one level of the hierarchy will not be affected
by the disconnection of brokers at a higher level.
4 OVERVIEW OF PROTECTION SCHEME
While the introduction of a broker hierarchy does serve as a good
starting point for protecting an IoT framework against malicious
or accidental cloud disconnection, it is the position of this work
that the scoping rule and event filtering/mapping of Fiege et al. do
not go far enough for addressing the access control needs of an
IoT framework, we therefore propose two additional protection
features in this work.
(1) Controlling flow of information. While encapsulation allows
the system architect to better reason about the behavior of individ-
ual distributed software components and compose them together
with ease, it does not allow the security architect to impose finer-
grained control of information flow within the broker ensemble.
Certain brokers may host devices that publish sensitive messages
(e.g., a broker that are connected to sensors in the master bedroom
of a smart home), and thus the security architect may want to make
sure that such events are received only by a selected group of autho-
rized devices. One way to achieve this is to control the information
flow paths in the broker ensemble. To this end we propose a gener-
alization of Fiege et al.’s architecture, so that arbitrary brokering
policies can be imposed on the broker ensemble to control informa-
tion flow paths. The scoping rule of Fiege et al. becomes a special
case of these brokering policies.
(2) Enforcing collaboration protocols. When devices collaborate
with one another, there are typically well-understood collaboration
protocols that they have to follow. Unfortunately, IoT devices have
limited capabilities, and thus they are easy to compromise. In fact,
we should take as an axiom that they will be compromised sooner
or later. Compromised devices may not follow the intended collab-
oration protocol, and thus the integrity of the collaboration will be
destroyed. We propose an extension of Fiege et al.’s architecture,
so that execution monitors can be put in place to detect violation
of the collaboration protocol, or even enforce the protocol by mod-
ifying the message exchanged by the devices. The event filtering
and event mapping features of Fiege et al.’s architecture become
special cases of execution monitors.
4.1 Configurable Brokering Policies
Rather than having a fixed scoping rule to regulate how events are
propagated among brokers, our scheme allows the security architect
to impose arbitrary brokering policies. A brokering policy is a
system-wide scheme for deciding how each broker is to forward
events. The broker ensemble is no longer organized as a hierarchy.
Instead, brokers are peers that propagate events in accordance to the
brokering policies. A brokering policy is composed of the following
elements.
(1) When two brokers (or a device and a broker) are connected
to one another, we treat each direction of communication a distinct
network link. Each network link is assigned a link type. These link
types are domain specific, and the security architect can choose
to create link types that are relevant to the application domain
in question. For example, when we model Bell-LaPadula (BLP)-
style information flow control, a link type could be “confidential”,
indicating that the events passing through the network links with
this label carry confidential information (§6.1.1). Alternatively, to
model the Fiege et al. broker hierarchy, a network link from a child
broker to a parent broker can be associated with the link type “up”
(§6.1.2).
(2) A brokering table, which is replicated to all the brokers,
specifies if a broker may forward an event that it receives from a
network link of type t1 to a network link of type t2. In short, the
brokering table is an n × n table of boolean values, where n is the
number of link types.
As we shall see, the provision for configurable brokering policies
allow the security architect to control the information flow paths
in the broker ensemble (§6.1.1).
4.2 History-Tracking Execution Monitors
Rather than imposing an event filter or an event mapper along
network links, our scheme allows arbitrary execution monitors to
be interposed along network links. An execution monitor intercepts
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every event moving along a network link, and responds by (a) sup-
pressing the event, (b) leaving the event as is, or (c) transforming
the event to another sequence of events. Note that option (c) may in-
volve injecting new events into the network link. More importantly,
an execution monitor is stateful, thereby enabling the execution
monitor to enforce History-Based Access Control (HBAC) policies
[16, 21, 26, 28, 29, 36, 39, 40]. This history-tracking feature of an
execution monitor is the key to enforcing collaboration protocols
among devices (§4.3). We will demonstrate that event filtering and
event mapping are but special cases for our execution monitors
(§6.2).
Let us make these notions formal. Let Σ be an alphabet of events.
(More precisely, these are event topics. We identify events by their
event topics when the event payloads are not our focus.) We use
a, b and c to denote members of Σ, and write u, v andw to denote
members of Σ∗.
Ligatti et al. proposed the edit automaton (EA) as an abstract
model of execution monitors. An edit automaton transforms a se-
quence of events generated by an untrusted program to another
sequence of events that is safe for the observer to consume [28, 29].
The idea is that certain event sequences may damage the integrity
of the observer, and thus to protect the observer those sequences
are “rewritten” to a benign form. We have adapted their definition
to a form that is readily implementable. More specifically, we define
an edit automaton (EA) to be a quadruple ⟨Σ,Q,q0,δ⟩, such that
Σ is a finite set of symbols,Q is a countable set of states, and q0 ∈ Q
is the initial state, and δ : Q ×Σ→ Q ×Σ∗ is the transition function
(NB: a total function). Given a current state q and an input symbol
a, δ (q,a) is a pair (q′,w), where q′ is the next state, andw is a se-
quence of output symbols generated by the transition. If the output
sequencew is empty (i.e., ϵ), then the input event is “suppressed.”
δ can also function as an event mapper: that is when the output
sequencew is a single symbol b, meaning that δ replaces the input
event a by an output event b. Lastly, δ may also inject events: that
is whenw has multiple events.
In the rest of this paper, we may draw transition diagrams to
represent an edit automaton (Fig. 3 and 4). When we do so, the
following convention is used.
Convention 1. The following conventions are followed when
the transition diagram of an edit automaton is drawn. (1) The state
labelled q0 is the initial state. (2) If the label “a → w” appears on a
transition edge from state q to q′, then that transition will be triggered
on input event a, and the latter is transformed into the output event
sequence w (i.e., δ (q,a) = (q′,w)). (3) We write “a” as a shorthand
for the transition label “a → a” (i.e., a is preserved). (4) We write “¬a”
as a shorthand for the transition label “a → ϵ” (i.e., a is suppressed).
(5) If the labels “∗ → w”, “∗”, or “¬∗” appear on a transition edge from
q to q′, then they mean “a → w”, “a”, and “¬a” respectively for every
event a ∈ Σ that does not appear on any transition edge emanating
from q. (6) If none of the labels “∗ → w”, “∗”, or “¬∗” appears on any
transition edge emanating from q, then implicitly there is a transition
edge from q to q itself, with the label “¬∗”.
4.3 Case Study
We illustrate the use of our proposed architecture by an example
smart home configuration.
MD
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Figure 2: Brokers, devices, and network links in the smart
home example. Ovals and boxes represent brokers and de-
vices respectively. Dotted arrows represent links that are of
type internet; solid arrows, type door; wavy arrows, type sen-
sitive. Edit automata M1 and M2 are deployed respectively
along the link from I to H and the link from H to S .
q0 ∗, ¬DL_unlockxx
Figure 3: Edit automaton M1 for enforcing Policy 3 (Vis-
ibility Control). M1 has only one state, which suppresses
DL_unlock but preserves all other events. Consult Conven-
tion 1 for how transition diagrams are to be interpreted.
A Smart Home. The home owner has installed the following
devices: a motion detector (MD), a security camera (SC), a door lock
(DL), and a door bell (DB). In addition, the home owner carries a
smart phone (SP).
Suppose all devices are connected to a centralized, cloud-based
broker. For brevity, we identify an event by its topic in the following
discussion. The normal flow of events is listed below:
(1) MD is used for detecting if someone is currently at home.
MD periodically announces its findings by publishing either
MD_motion or MD_no_motion.
(2) DB subscribes to MD_motion and MD_no_motion, and updates
its internal state accordingly.
(3) When a person presses DB, the latter checks its internal state to
see if anyone is at home. If someone is home, then the following
steps are skipped.
(4) If no one is at home, DB will request SC to take a picture
of the person at the door by publishing SC_request. Upon
notification, SC will send a picture by publishing an SC_send
event with the picture as the payload.
(5) Upon receiving the picture, DB publishes an eventwith AC_request
as its topic and the picture as its payload.
(6) SP subscribes to AC_request. The home owner will examine
the picture of the person at the door, and decide if access should
be granted. If so, then SP will publish AC_grant. Otherwise, SP
publishes AC_deny.
(7) When DB receives an AC_grant, it will request DL to unlock
the front door by publishing DL_unlock.
Policies. We desire to enforce four policies in the smart home
environment.
Policy 1 (Resiliency Against Cloud Disconnection). If the
cloud is ever disconnected, minimum services shall be available.
For example, even though it is impossible to contact SP in the
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Figure 4: Edit automaton M2 for enforcing Policy 4 (Collab-
oration Protocol). M2 permits event sequences “AC_request,
AC_grant, DL_unlock” and “AC_request, AC_deny.” Any extra
DL_unlock events that appear out of order are suppressed.
Consult Convention 1 for how transition diagrams are to be
interpreted.
event of cloud disconnection, MD should still be able to update the
internal state of DB.
Policy 2 (Information Flow Control). Events with topics
MD_motion and MD_no_motion are sensitive information, and shall
not be leaked outside of the home for privacy sake.
Policy 3 (Visibility Control). DL_unlock is a sensitive con-
trol signal, and should only be sent from within the home. Any
DL_unlock event that is sent from the internet is discarded.
Policy 4 (Collaboration Protocol). It is possible that some of
the devices (e.g., DB) are compromised. We want to make sure
that DL_unlock is published only as the last event in the sequence:
AC_request, AC_grant, DL_unlock. Any deviation from this col-
laboration protocol is a sign that some of the devices have been
compromised.
To enforce the policies stated above, the smart home is reconfig-
ured according to Fig. 2. We explain the configuration below.
Enforcing Policy 1 (Resiliency Against Cloud Disconnection). No-
tice that multiple brokers are introduced (Fig. 2). The broker I is
hosted in the cloud, which provides a point of contact to the SP.
The broker H is a gateway to the local network of the smart home.
Broker S and the home devices are connected to H and to each
other via a LAN. If the cloud is ever disconnected (i.e., the network
links between H and I are severed), the rest of the broker ensemble
will still be functional.
Enforcing Policy 2 (Information Flow Control). As shown in Fig. 2,
the network links are classified into three types: (a) sensitive, (b)
door, and (c) internet. A global brokering policy is formulated in
such a way that the following propagation is not allowed:
Brokering Policy. Events received from a link of type sensi-
tive cannot be propagated to a link of type internet.
All other forms of propagation are allowed. The overall effect of
this brokering policy is that MD_motion and MD_no_motion are not
propagated by H to I , thus sensitive events remain inside the home.
Enforcing Policy 3 (Visibility Control). We want to filter away any
DL_unlock events that pass through the network link from broker
I to broker H . This is achieved by placing an edit automaton M1
along that network link (Fig. 2). The definition ofM1 is depicted in
the transition diagram in Fig. 3, which preserves all events except
for DL_unlock. Note two points. First, Policy 3 cannot be enforced
by brokering policies, as we allow some events (e.g., AC_grant, see
below) from broker I to enter broker S , but disallow others (e.g.,
DL_unlock) to do so. Second, sinceM1 has only one state, Policy 3
does not exploit the history tracking feature of an edit automaton.
Enforcing Policy 4 (Collaboration Protocol). Policy 4 is a history-
based policy. Its enforcement requires the stateful tracking of event
history. To this end, an EA M2 is interposed along the network
link from broker H to broker S (Fig. 4).M2 permits the sequences
“AC_request, AC_grant, DL_unlock” and “AC_request, AC_deny.”
Any out-of-order occurrences of DL_unlock are suppressed. Notice
that all events with topics AC_request, AC_grant, AC_deny, and
DL_unlock will pass through H , which in turn propagates them to
S . In this way, the collaboration protocol is enforced byM2 before
the events can reach DL. This protects the integrity of DL even if
other devices are compromised. Note that the interposing of M2
between H and S requires the system to track the automaton state.
In summary, we have demonstrated how the proposed protection
scheme supports resiliency against cloud disconnection, informa-
tion flow control, visibility control, and collaboration protocols.
5 OPERATIONAL SEMANTICS
This section presents the operational semantics of our proposed
architecture in the form of a state machine model. Minor variants of
this model have been “mechanized” using PLT Redex [17], a seman-
tic engineering tool. The PLT Redex encoding of our state machine
model consists of 820 lines of code, including both model definition
and test cases. The mechanized model is executable. This exercise
has allowed us to gain deeper insights into our formulation, and to
catch a few errors in our early work. The mathematical formulation
and the PLT Redex encoding lay the semantic foundation for future
study of policy enforceability (see §9).
5.1 System Configuration
The configuration of an event-based system is captured in a (sys-
tem) schema χ , which is a quadruple ⟨CG,BP, EP, sub,⊑⟩ with
the components below:
• CG is a connection graph of the form ⟨D,B, link⟩:
– D and B are two disjoint, finite sets of entities. D is the set
of devices, and B is the set of brokers. We write E to denote
D ∪ B.
– link ⊆ E × E is a binary relation over entities. It represents
network connections. The binary relation link satisfies two
additional requirements: (a) link is symmetric but irreflexive;
(b) link ∩ (D × D) = ∅.
Furthermore, link induces four binary relations: (a) publish =
link∩(D×B) captures device-to-broker links, (b) notify = link∩
(B×D) captures broker-to-device links, (c) bridge = link∩(B×B)
captures broker-to-broker links, and (d)monitored = link \notify
captures links with a broker as the destination.
• BP is the brokering policy, which is a structure of the form
⟨T , type, allow⟩:
– T is a finite set of link types.
– type : link → T assigns a link type to each link.
– allow ⊆ T×T is a binary relation defined overT . If allow(t1, t2),
then a broker is allowed to pass along an event it receives from
a link of type t1 to a link of type t2.
The brokering policy BP induces a ternary relation propagate ⊆
E × E × E, so that propagate(x ,y, z) iff link(x ,y), link(y, z), and
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allow(type(x ,y), type(y, z)). That is, propagate(x ,y, z) asserts that
an event passing through link (x ,y) is allowed to be further prop-
agated by the broker y through the link (y, z).
• The event policy EP is a quadruple ⟨Σ,Q,q0,∆⟩:
– Σ,Q , andq0 are the components of an EA. Σ is the set of events
(more precisely event topics) that can be transmitted in the
event-based system.
– ∆ : monitored → (Q × Σ→ Q × Σ∗) assigns an EA transition
function to each monitored link.
More specifically, the EA M(x ,y) = ⟨Σ,Q,q0,∆(x ,y)⟩ is the EA
that transforms the events sent from x to y.
• sub : notify → 2Σ assigns a set of events to each broker-to-device
link. Intuitively, sub(x ,y) is the set of events subscribed by device
y in broker x .
• ⊑ is a partial ordering defined over the set of annotated tasks.
Intuitively, the dynamics of the system is modelled as the gener-
ation and discharging of tasks. These tasks are “queued up” in a
work list within the system state for further processing. A task
τ is defined via the following grammar.
τ ::= transmit(x ,y,a) | broker(x ,y,w)
where x ,y ∈ E, a ∈ Σ, andw ∈ Σ∗. We write TK χ for the set of
all tasks defined for schema χ .
An annotated task is a construct of the form τ [tgen, tpub], in which
the task τ is annotated with two timestamps (i.e., natural num-
bers), (i) tgen, the generation time of τ , and (ii) tpub , the generation
time of the event publication task from which τ is derived. We
write AT χ to denote the set of all annotated tasks for schema χ ,
and write α for a typical member of AT χ .
By imposing the partial ordering ⊑ over AT χ to indicate how
tasks are prioritized, one can simulate different relative network
speeds (see [22, §3.3.6] for examples). In particular, if α ⊑ α ′,
then α will be processed before α ′. The annotation of tasks allows
⊑ to be formulated in terms of timestamps.
5.2 System States
Given a schema χ , a system state γ is a triple ⟨t , ST ,WL⟩:
• The system state tracks a global clock, for which t ∈ N is the
current time. The clock is used within the model for producing
timestamps.
• ST : monitored → Q is a function assigning an EA state to each
link that is monitored by an EA. In particular, ST (x ,y) is the
current state ofM(x ,y), the EA guarding link (x ,y).
• Thework list WL ⊆ AT χ is a finite set of annotated tasks. In the
following, the predicate select(α ,WL) asserts that α is a minimal
element in WL according to ⊑. Note that for a given WL there
may be multiple annotated tasks satisfying the select predicate.
As usual, nondeterminism is implied in such cases.
Let Γχ be the set of all system states as defined above. We write
γ to denote a typical member of Γχ . The initial state of a system
is γinit = ⟨0, ST init , ∅⟩, where ST init (x ,y) = q0 for every (x ,y) ∈
monitored.
5.3 State Transition
Given a schema χ , we define a state transition relation · →χ · ⊆
Γχ × Γχ . Intuitively, γ →χ γ ′ means that γ ′ is a successor state of γ .
The transition relation is defined by the following set of transition
rules, which specify the condition under whichγ →χ γ ′, whereγ =
⟨t , ST ,WL⟩, and γ ′ = ⟨t ′, ST ′,WL′⟩. In the following specification,
we follow the convention that by default t ′ = t + 1, ST ′ = ST and
WL′ = WL, unless the rules explicitly say otherwise.
• T-Publish. Generate an event publication task.
◦ Precondition: publish(x ,y), and a ∈ Σ.
◦ Effect:WL′ = WL ∪ { transmit(x ,y,a)[t , t] }.
• T-Notify. Consume an event notification task.
◦ Precondition: select(α ,WL), α = τ [tgen, tpub], τ =
transmit(x ,y,a), and notify(x ,y).
◦ Effect:WL′ = WL \ { α }.
• T-Deliver. Transmit an event over a link, and apply execution
monitor to the transmitted event.
◦ Precondition: select(α ,WL), α = τ [tgen, tpub], τ =
transmit(x ,y,a), and monitored(x ,y).
◦ Effect: Letδ = ∆(x ,y) and (q,w) = δ (ST (x ,y),a). Then ST ′(x ,y) =
q, andWL′ = WL1 ∪WL2, where:
WL1 = WL \ { α }
WL2 =
{
{ broker(x ,y,w)[t , tpub] } ifw , ϵ
∅ otherwise
• T-Broker. Process a sequence of received events to create further
transmissions.
◦ Precondition: select(α ,WL), α = τ [tgen, tpub], and τ =
broker(x ,y,aw), such that a ∈ Σ andw ∈ Σ∗.
◦ Effect: Let Z = {z ∈ E | bridge(y, z) ∨ (notify(y, z) ∧ a ∈
sub(y, z))}. ThenWL′ = WL1 ∪WL2 ∪WL3, where:
WL1 = WL \ { α }
WL2 =
{
{ broker(x ,y,w)[t , tpub] } ifw , ϵ
∅ otherwise
WL3 = { transmit(y, z,a)[t , tpub] |
z , x ∧ z ∈ Z ∧ propagate(x ,y, z) }
6 USAGE PATTERNS
We explore how the two protection mechanisms, brokering control
and executionmonitoring, can be leveraged to impose various forms
of access control policies in an event-based system.
6.1 Access Control with Brokering Policies
The most liberal brokering policy is BP0 = ⟨T0, type0, allow0⟩,
where T0 is a singleton set {t0}, type0 maps every link to t0, and
allow0 = {(t0, t0)}. This trivial brokering policy allows every event
received from a link to be forwarded to another link. This set-up
is essentially the bridge feature of Mosquitto [15]: a bridge con-
nects two MQTT brokers, so that the events received by one broker
are made visible to the other broker. This liberal brokering pol-
icy, however, suffers from the following shortcoming. The brokers
connected by bridges form a single scope of events. There is no
regulation of what events are visible to which subscribers, making
it difficulty to confine the visibility of sensitive events (e.g., personal
health alerts). Imposing brokering policies more restrictive than
BP0 allows us to regulate the flow of information, as we illustrate
in the following.
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6.1.1 Information Flow Control. Brokering policies allow us to
impose a form of information flow control in the style of the Bell-
LaPadula (BLP) model [27]. The basic idea of the BLP scheme is that
information sources (e.g., publishers) and information consumers
(e.g., subscribers) are labelled with security labels (e.g., unclassified,
confidential, secret, top secret). These security labels form a lattice
structure, and is thus partially ordered. BLP is essentially an access
control model that forbids “reading up” and “writing down” [34].
Informationmay only flow from “low” information sources to “high”
information consumers.
In our context, an event publication is a “write,” and an event
subscription can be considered a “read.” Rather than assigning se-
curity labels to entities, we opt for a more uniform and flexible
approach, and assign security labels to links. The key idea is that
when a broker y receives an event from a link (x ,y), y is allowed to
propagate the event to a subsequent link (y, z) if the security label
of the second link is at least as high as the security label of the first
link. Consequently, the semantics of assigning a security label t to
a link is that events flowing through that link comes from sources
with security labels lower than or equal to t . When an event is
transmitted through the system, it goes through links with mono-
tonically increasing labels t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t3 ≤ . . .. More specifically,
one can configure the brokering policy BP = ⟨T , type, allow⟩ as
follows to control the flow of information within the system.
• Let (T , ≤) be a partially ordered set of security labels.
• The function type assigns a security label to each link, in such
a way that type(x ,y) ≤ type(y, z) whenever y ∈ D. That is, a
notification link of a devicey must have a security label no higher
than the security label of every publication link of y, In other
words, the device is “reading down” through the notification link,
and “writing up” through the publication link.
• Define allow so that allow(t1, t2) only if t1 ≤ t2. That is, an event
flowing through a link (x ,y) with a security label l will only be
propagated to a link (y, z) with a security label h at least as high
as l .
With the scheme above, successive links that transmit an event will
have monotonically increasing security labels. We formalize this
observation as follows.
A sequence x0x1 . . . xn of entities in CG is called a flow path
if (a) (xi ,xi+1) ∈ link for 0 ≤ i < n, (b) for 0 < i < n, if xi ∈ B,
then xi−1 , xi+1 and propagate(xi−1,xi ,xi+1). A flow path is a
flow route when none of the entities other than the two ends
(i.e., x1, x2, . . . , xn−1) is a device. A flow path is a potential path of
information flow through the system. Intermediary entities along a
flow path can be devices which read a message and then propagate
information by publishing a correlated message. A flow route is a
flow path for which the intermediary entities are all brokers.
With the way allow is defined, type(xi−1,xi ) ≤ type(xi ,xi+1)
when a broker xi relays a message from link (xi−1,xi ) to link
(xi ,xi+1). Thus a message passes through links of monotonically
increasing security labels as it travels through a flow route. A flow
path is essentially the concatenation of flow routes for which the
concatenation points are devices. The definition of type ensures
that monotonicity is preserved by such concatenation.
The administrator of the system may have some preconceived
ideas about what flow paths (resp. routes) are permitted. An im-
portant validation task is to ensure that the configuration of the
connection graph and the brokering policy does not violate her
expectation. Given a connection graph CG = ⟨D,B, link⟩, one can
use a variant of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [13, §26.2] to compute
whether there is a legitimate flow path between each pair of enti-
ties (more precisely, between each pair of links). Described in [22,
Appendix A], the algorithm runs in O(M3) time, whereM = |link |.
The algorithm can be adopted to identify either flow paths or flow
routes. Such an analysis allows us to debug the topology of the
connection graph and the assignment of security labels, so as to
ensure that devices that are supposed to communicate with one
another can do so, and flow paths that are not supposed to exist are
not accidentally enabled.
6.1.2 Component Architecture. The modular event-based systems
proposed in [19, 20] is the idea that brokers are organized into a
hierarchy, so that each broker “glues” its children entities together
to form a distributed software component. The Fiege et al. Scop-
ing Rule of §3 provides a principled way for these hierarchically
organized software components to communicate events with one
another. We demonstrate in the following that such a scoping rule
can be simulated using brokering policies.
We assume that the hierarchy is specified through a parenthood
relation, parent ⊆ E × E. Intuitively, parent(x ,y) asserts that y is
a parent of x . Two further restrictions apply to the specification
of parent. First, a device is never a parent of any entity. Second,
parenthood chains never form a cycle, not even a loop (i.e., a loop
arises when an entity is its own parent).
Based on the given parenthood relation, the following brokering
policy is formulated:
• Let T = { up, down }.
• The function type encodes the parenthood relation: type(x ,y) =
up if parent(x ,y), and type(x ,y) = down otherwise.
• Define allow so that allow(t1, t2) holds unless t1 = down and
t2 = up. Effectively, a message can move “up” the hierarchy, and
then “down”, but never move “up” after it has moved “down.”
The brokering policy above ensures that events published in a
broker x is visible to subscribers in another broker y if and only if x
andy share a common ancestor in the hierarchy. To see this, observe
that a flow route from one device to another will only go from “up”
to “down” but not vice versa. This essentially means that the flow
route will first reach a common ancestor of the two devices before
reaching its destination. Thus the sharing of a common ancestor
determines visibility.
6.2 Access Control with Edit Automata
We have already seen in the case study of §4.3 that the history
tracking feature of an edit automaton can be used for enforcing
collaboration protocols (e.g., Policy 4) among a group of interacting
devices. We do not further elaborate on this use.
Event filtering and event mapping are popular visibility control
mechanisms in event-based systems. They are featured in the model
of Fiege et al. [18, 20], and implemented in Mosquitto [15]. We
demonstrate that these two features are special cases of execution
monitoring by edit automata. We then show how brokering policies
can be combined with edit automata to simulate complex protection
domains in event-based systems.
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6.2.1 Event Filtering. Some events are used for coordination logics
that belong to the internal working of a distributed software com-
ponent. Publications of such events should not be visible outside of
the component because of confidentiality considerations, and sub-
scriptions of these events should not extend beyond the component
boundary in order that external events do not affect the integrity
of the component state.
Suppose E ⊆ Σ is a subset of events that are allowed to pass
through a link. Define the event filtering transition function
filter(E) so that δ (q0,a) = (q0,a) if a ∈ E, and δ (q0,a) = (q0, ϵ)
if a < E. By setting ∆(x ,y) = filter(E)), only events in E will be
transmitted along the link.
Event filtering leads naturally to the notion of event “import”
and “export” for component architectures such as the one presented
in §6.1.2. A broker x can present an interface to each parent broker
y. The interface consists of a set Eimport of events that x is willing
to import from y, and a set Eexport of events x is willing to export
to y. To achieve the above, we set ∆(x ,y) = filter(Eexport ), and
∆(y,x) = filter(Eimport ).
6.2.2 Event Mapping. Event mapping is the transformation of
events from one naming scheme to another naming scheme when
they are transmitted along a link. Event mapping presents an al-
ternative interface of a distributed software component to a client
component, often for “gluing” purposes or for information hiding.
Suppose f : Σ→ Σ is a function that renames events. Define the
eventmapping transition functionmapper(f ) : Q×Σ→ Q×Σ∗
such that mapper(f )(q0,a) = (q0, f (a)). That is, the EA remains
in state q0 at all time, and output f (a) when the input event is a.
Setting ∆(x ,y) to mapper(f ) will cause all events passing through
link (x ,y) to be renamed according to f .
6.2.3 RBAC-style Protection Domains. In [10], a combination of
publish/subscribemiddleware and Role-BasedAccess Control (RBAC)
[35] is employed to control the events that clients (i.e., devices) are
allowed publish and subscribe. The idea is that clients are assigned
to roles, and membership in a role places limits on what events a
client can publish, as well as what events it is allowed to subscribe
to. Although the language of RBAC is used, a “role” here is essen-
tially a protection domain in the event-based system. (We are not
sanctioning RBAC for IoT!) We describe in the following how this
model can be simulated by multiple brokers, brokering policies, and
execution monitors.
We assume that the following RBAC policy is given: (1) a setD of
devices, (2) a set R of roles, (3) a user-role assignment UA ⊆ D × R
which specifies role membership, (4) a function pub : R → 2Σ
specifying for each role r ∈ R the set pub(r ) of events that members
of r can publish, and (5) a function sub : R → 2Σ specifying for each
role r ∈ R the set sub(r ) of events that members of r can subscribe to.
Based on the parameters above, we describe how one can construct
a connection graph, a brokering policy, and edit automata to enforce
the RBAC policy.
First, we introduce a set of brokers:
B = Broles ∪ {Bus} Broles = Bpub ∪ Bsub
Bpub = {rpub | r ∈ R} Bsub = {r sub | r ∈ R}
In short, we introduce two brokers, rpub and r sub, for each role
r . The intention is that clients belonging to role r will publish
events to the publication broker rpub and subscribes to events
through subscription broker r sub . A distinguished broker Bus is
also introduced to perform message relaying among the publication
and subscription brokers.
Second, the links between the entities are defined as follows:
link = link0 ∪ link−10
link0 = {(x ,Bus) | x ∈ Broles} ∪
{(x , rpub) | x ∈ D, (x , r ) ∈ UA} ∪
{(x , r sub) | x ∈ D, (x , r ) ∈ UA}
The link set link is the symmetric closure of link0, in which all
publication and subscription brokers are connected to the broker
Bus, and every device belonging to role r is connected to the brokers
rpub and r sub .
Third, the following brokering policy is defined:
T ={ SubUp, SubDown,
PubUp,PubDown,DevUp,DevDown }
type(x ,y) =

SubUp if x ∈ Bsub and y = Bus
SubDown if x = Bus and y ∈ Bsub
PubUp if x ∈ Bpub and y = Bus
PubDown if x = Bus and y ∈ Bpub
DevUp if x ∈ D and y ∈ Broles
DevDown if x ∈ Broles and y ∈ D
allow ={ (PubUp, SubDown),
(DevUp,PubUp), (SubDown,DevDown) }
In short, an event can only travel from a device to a publication
broker, then to broker Bus, then to a subscription broker, and lastly
to another device.
Fourth, edit automata that perform event filtering are imposed
along every link from a publication broker to Bus, and from Bus to
a subscription broker.
∆(x ,y) =
{
filter(sub(r )) if x = Bus and y = r sub
filter(pub(r )) if x = rpub and y = Bus
While the given RBAC policy can be simulated by the above
broker ensemble, brokering policy, and execution monitors, two
practical considerations remain.
First, it is important to ensure that only the devices who are
members of role r may connect to brokers rpub and r sub . For exam-
ple, the MQTT broker implementation Mosquitto [15] allows the
administrator to set up a local ACL for each broker. Such an ACL
can be used for encoding and enforcing role membership. More
sophisticated access control paradigm, such as ABAC, can be used
for authorizing a device into a role (i.e., a protection domain).
A second practical consideration is that, if a device belongs to
multiple roles, it may end up receiving the same event multiple
times. One way out is for the device to “activate” one role at a time,
or “activate” a subset of roles for which the subscribable event sets
are disjoint. In other words, even if a device belongs to multiple
Brokering Policies and Execution Monitors for IoT Middleware
roles, it can connect to a subset of them in order to avoid repeated
delivery of the same message.
An extension of the scheme is to support role hierarchies (i.e.,
hierarchical nesting of protection domains). The idea is that a senior
role (more capable protection domain) inherits all the publishable
events and subscribable events of its junior roles (less capable pro-
tection domains). This can be simulated readily by organizing the
publication and subscription brokers hierarchically to mirror the
role hierarchy.
7 IMPLEMENTATION
To evaluate the feasibility and the performance of brokering control
and execution monitoring for distributed event systems, we have
implemented a prototype of these two protection mechanisms in
the open-source Mosquitto broker [15, 30] for the MQTT protocol
[9]. MQTT is a messaging transport protocol that makes use of
the Publisher-Subscriber design pattern to provide one-to-many
message distribution and decoupling features [11]. It is used (or
supported) widely in existing IoT frameworks, including the IBM
Watson IoT platform, the Amazon AWS IoT platform, and the Mi-
crosoft Azure IoT platform.
Our implementation is based on the source code of Mosquitto
version 1.4.10, the latest version when this work started. The “diff”
between the original Mosquitto code base and our extension in-
volves 1,426 lines of C code across 19 source files (including 7 new
files we introduced into the code base).
7.1 Multiple Brokers
We reused the bridge facility offered by Mosquitto. This feature
allows a broker to be connected to another broker, so that the first
(aka child broker) behaves like a regular MQTT client of the second
(aka parent broker). Events received by the child broker will be
propagated to the parent broker, and vice versa. The interconnection
is established by a directive in the configuration file of the child
broker. To support event filtering, one can set up the configuration
file so as to limit what event topics can be propagated from the child
to the parent, and what other topics can be propagated in the other
direction. A degenerate configuration is to allow the propagation
of all topics, in both directions. Brokering policies and execution
monitors are implemented on top of this bridge facility.
7.2 Brokering Policies
We extended Mosquitto so that each broker can be configured with
an arbitrary brokering policy. Specifically, we extended the syntax
of the Mosquitto configuration file, so that the administrator can
(a) define an arbitrary number of link types, (b) specify the allow
relation by enumerating all the pairs (t1, t2) that are in allow (or
alternatively, identify those that are not in allow), and (c) assign
a link type to each link that goes into or out of the broker. This
configuration mechanism is more general than the formal model
presented in §5, as each broker can be configured separately.
The broker implementation is extended to honor the brokering
policy specified in the configuration file. Specifically, when an event
is received by the broker, the original Mosquitto implementation
(the _subs_process function in subs.c) enqueues this event to all
intended recipients (including regular MQTT clients, child brokers,
and parent brokers). We modified this step by not enqueuing an
event for a recipient in case that propagation is not permitted by
the brokering policy.
7.3 Execution Monitors
To accommodate user-defined execution monitors, we have imple-
mented a “plug-in” architecture for administrator to specify arbi-
trary execution monitors as shared libraries (.so files on Linux),
and to configure the broker to interpose these execution monitors
along subsets of links.
7.3.1 MonitorModules. The developer of an executionmonitor can
implement an edit automaton as a shared library in the C program-
ming language. We have designed an Application Programming
Interface (API) for facilitating the interaction between the extended
Mosquitto implementation and these edit automata. The execution
monitor is exported to the broker as a “vtable”, which is a table
of function pointers, pointing to (a) the constructor and destruc-
tor functions of an edit automaton instance (recall that execution
monitoring is stateful), and (b) the transition function.
When the shared library is loaded via dynamic linking into the
broker at the time of start-up, the constructor function will be called
to initialize the automaton instance. The destructor will be used
for cleaning up the automaton instance when the broker shuts
down. Whenever a new message is received by the broker along
a link monitored by the edit automaton instance, the transition
function will be invoked with three arguments: (a) the message, (b)
the current automaton state, and (c) an event queue. The transition
function has two responsibilities. First, the transition function up-
dates the automaton state. Second, the transition function produces
a sequence of output events. The latter is achieved by enqueueing
the output events into the event queue.
To facilitate the implementation of the transition function, the
broker context is captured into a vtable, which, again, is a table of
function pointers, pointing to broker facilities that the transition
function may take advantage of. These broker facilities include,
for example, dynamic memory allocation and logging. More im-
portantly, the broker context vtable also provides facilities for the
transition function to enqueue messages into the message queue.
This is how the transition function can implement suppression,
transformation, and injection of events. Elaborate design and im-
plementation work has been performed to make sure that such a
framework interoperates well with the message flow of all the three
Quality-of-Service (QoS) levels of MQTT. Interested readers are
directed to [22, §4.3.3] for such details.
7.3.2 Configuration. Wehave extended the syntax of theMosquitto
configuration file so that the administrator can specify which shared
libraries will be loaded as execution monitors. The syntax also al-
lows one to specify which subset of network links will be moni-
tored by a given execution monitor. More specifically, we defined
fourmessage flow directions, each corresponding to a subset of
network links that can be monitored by an edit automaton: (1) Im-
port Publication (im_pub): an incoming link from a child entity
(i.e., an MQTT client or a child broker); (2) Import Subscription
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Figure 5: Connections between brokers and client machines
in experimental scenarios.
(im_sub): an outgoing link to a child entity; (3) Export Publica-
tion (ex_pub): an incoming link from a parent broker; (4) Export
Pubscription (ex_sub): an outgoing link to a parent broker.
8 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
An empirical study has been conducted to profile the impact that
multiple brokers, brokering policies, and executionmonitoring have
on the performance of an event-based system. In similar studies
[8, 24], two standard measurements used to compare performance
in networking technologies are (a) latency and (b) message through-
put. Latency is the time it takes to deliver one message from one
designated point to another (e.g. from a publisher to a subscriber),
whereas message throughput is the rate in which messages are
delivered.
We evaluated the performance impact of the proposed protection
mechanisms by measuring how they affect message throughput.
This is achieved by comparing the message throughput of the origi-
nal Mosquitto implementation against that of the extended version
reported in §7. We chose to measure and report message through-
put rather than latency due to the following reasons: (1) Message
throughput is commonly used to establish requirements and limits
for IoT technologies [1, 3]. (2) Preliminary experiments we con-
ducted to measure latency showed negligible differences between
the original version of Mosquitto and the extended version. (3) The
aforementioned preliminary experiments were susceptible to la-
tency peaks, which resulted in inconsistent results, sometimes even
favouring the extended version of Mosquitto. (4) In similar experi-
ments conducted by Babovic et al. [8], they recognize the impor-
tance of measuring message throughput to minimize error.
8.1 Experimental Setup
In our experiments, we compared the message throughput of five
configurations (§8.1.1) of Mosquitto deployed in three different
scenarios (§8.1.2). For each configuration-scenario combination,
we repeated the experiment for six rounds (§8.1.3). A different
number of messages was published in each round, and we measured
the resulting message throughput in each case.
8.1.1 Broker Configurations. Two versions of Mosquitto were used
in our study. We use “original Mosquitto” to refer to Mosquitto
1.4.10, and “extended Mosquitto” to refer to the implementation
reported in §7. We prepared five different broker configurations.
(1) ORI. This configuration runs the original Mosquitto, and
serves as the baseline for our experiments.
(2) NEW. This configuration runs the extended Mosquitto, but
no edit automaton is installed. This configuration is for evaluating
the performance impact of the execution monitor plugin infrastruc-
ture in extended Mosquitto.
(3) SEM. This configuration runs extended Mosquitto with a
simple execution monitor that passes on the input message unal-
tered. This is the fastest possible execution monitor.
(4) CEM. This configuration runs extended Mosquitto with a
complex execution monitor that does some random work for each
byte in the message payload, and produces a random output mes-
sage with the same size as the input message. This typifies a monitor
that runs in time proportional to the message size.
(5) CMT. This is not really an actual broker configuration, but
a hypothetical, idealized broker configuration that incurs zero la-
tency. Its message throughput, which we call Computed Message
Throughput (CMT), is always the same as the message publish
rate.1 This is essentially a theoretical upper bound for the message
throughput.
The installed edit automata in SEM and CEM process the mes-
sages received by the broker, before the broker propagates the
messages to neighbouring brokers and subscribers. If multiple bro-
kers are deployed in a scenario, then the same edit automaton is
installed in every broker.
Lastly, if a scenario involves multiple brokers (§8.1.2), then ORI
uses the bridge feature of Mosquitto, and the rest of the configura-
tions use the simple brokering policy that implements Fiege et al.’s
scoping rule (see §3 and §6.1.2).
8.1.2 Connection Scenarios. We experimented with different num-
ber of interconnected brokers in order to evaluate how multiple
brokers and brokering policies influence the message throughput.
Fig. 5 show how brokers and client machines are connected to one
another in a typical experimental scenario. Scenarios differ by hav-
ing a different number of brokers. In each of the three scenarios,
there arem brokers, and their connections form a chain. The value
ofm is 1, 3, and 5 respectively for Scenario 1, 2, and 3.
At the beginning of the chain is a broker that we designate
PBroker, and the last broker in the chain is designated SBroker. In
Scenario 1, both PBroker and SBroker refer to the same broker.
Publishers and subscribers are spawned across fourteen different
client machines, where each machine launches a single subscriber
and n publishers. The exact value of n depends on the setup of the
round (see §8.1.3). Publishers publish to PBroker, and subscribers
register their subscriptions on SBroker.
8.1.3 Publishing Rounds. Multiple rounds of experiments are con-
ducted for each configuration-scenario combination. In each round,
a fixed number of events per second were published for a period
of 10 minutes (600 seconds). We use the term Message Publish
Rate (MPR) to refer to the speed in which messages are published
in a given round. MPR is measured inmessage per second (mps).
More specifically, six rounds of messages were published for each
configuration-scenario combination, with an MPR of 5K, 10K, 15K,
20K, 25K, and 30K mps respectively. Since fourteen client machines
are used for launching publishers, a total ofm = MPR/14 publishers
were spawned on each client machine.
1In the other experiments we conducted to evaluate how message suppression and
injection by edit automata affect message throughput, CMT takes amuchmore complex
form. See [22, §5.3.1] for more details.
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Figure 6: Results of experiments: Message Throughput (MT) versus Message Publish Rate (MPR)
Every published message has the same payload size of 175 bytes.
This size was chosen to represent the typical payload of sensor read-
ings. An example of an MQTT message carrying information about
the status of a battery is reported in [2], with a payload size of 97
bytes. A payload size of 175 bytes is therefore a conservative over-
estimate. The message topics and the subscriptions are arranged so
that every message is intended for exactly one subscriber.
We then measured the overall Message Throughput (MT), which
is also measured in mps. TheMT of the publishing round is obtained
by the following formula:
MT = (# messages received by all subscribers) ÷ 600sec
8.1.4 Hardware and Software. Fourteen machines were used to
launch publishers and subscribers, and (up to) five machines were
used to runMosquitto brokers. Thesemachines are virtual machines
hosted in the following hardware: • Chasis: IBM BladeCenter H
type • Storage: SAN = 600 GB + 300 GB + 2TB • Visualization
Software: WMware ESXi, 4.1.0, 800380 • Processor Type: Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU X5660 @ 2.80GHz • CPU Cores: 12 CPUs x 2.8 GHz
All virtual machines have the following specifications: • OS:
Centos release 6.9 (Final) • CPU: Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X5660 @
2.80GHz (1 core) •Memory: 8 GB • Disk Space: 14 GB
The following software are used in our experiments. (1)Mzbench
[4]: Load Testing Tool where users are able to write benchmarking
scenarios (in Erlang or Python) for testing applications with dif-
ferent protocols. (2) vmq_mzbench [5]:Mzbench worker for the
MQTT protocol. Publishers and subscribers used in the experiment
are Mzbench scenarios which use the vmq_mzbench worker.
8.2 Results and Analysis
The Message Throughputs (MT) of the various configurations is
plotted against different Message Publish Rates (MPR) in Fig. 6,
with one plot for each of the three scenarios.
Fig. 6a shows the results for Scenario 1, which involves only one
broker. This scenario highlights the relative performance of the
various configurations in the absence of interconnected brokers.
Not only did the original Mosquitto implementation (ORI) achieve
the idealized Message Throughput (CMT), the extended Mosquitto
implementation (NEW) can do the samewhen no executionmonitor
is installed. This means that when the security mechanisms are in-
active, the performance impact of the added software infrastructure
is negligible.
In Fig. 6a, we also notice that when edit automata are installed,
the Message Throughput began to drop after the Message Publish
Rate reached a certain point. This is when the broker was over-
whelmed, and started to drop messages. The best achieved Message
Throughput prior to message dropping signifies the capacity of the
configuration in question: 25K mps for SEM, and 20K mps for CEM.
This means that as the edit automaton does more work, the best
achieved Message Throughput degrades. This pattern persists in
Scenario 2 and 3 (Fig. 6b and 6c).
Fig. 6b and 6c show the impact of multiple brokers and brokering
policies. Now even the ORI and NEW configurations failed to match
the idealized Message Throughput (CMT). As expected, the more
brokers are involved, the higher the latency, and the best achieved
Message Throughput will decline. Scenario 3 introduces the most
latency of the three scenarios, as five interconnected brokers were
involved. In that case, the best achieved Message Throughput of
CEM was 15K mps.
To put our results into perspective, consider the throughput
limits of the IoT cloud services offered by Amazon and Microsoft.
• Amazon established a limit of 9K publish requests per AWS ac-
count for their AWS Services (Table Message Broker Limits in
the website) [1]. This means that each AWS account can publish
a maximum of 9K mps to their Message Broker.
• Microsoft divides their IoT Hubs solutions into three tiers: S1,
S2 and S3 [3]. Tier S3 is the most powerful of them, allowing
an average message throughput of 208,333 messages per minute
(i.e., approximately 3.5K mps).
Comparing these values against best achieved Message Throughput
of 15K mps achieved by CEM (the configuration with the slowest
execution monitor among the five) in Scenario 3 (the scenario with
the highest latency among the three), our proposed protection
scheme appears to have no trouble coping with the throughput
requirements expected in commercial IoT frameworks.
Additional experiments are reported in [22, §5.3.4]. These ex-
periments study how Message Throughput is impacted by edit
automata that either suppress or inject messages.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we have demonstrated the utility and performance
of three protection mechanisms for event-based systems: multiple
brokers, brokering policies, and execution monitors. A number of
research directions are listed here. (1) We would like to be able
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to specify the overall collaboration protocol of an ensemble of de-
vices, and then compile the specification to low-level brokering
policies and edit automata for enforcement. This relieves the user
from having to write error-prone scripts, as is now practised in
many commercial IoT frameworks. (2) Exactly what family of secu-
rity policies are enforceable [21, 28, 29, 36] by the combination of
multiple brokers, brokering policies, and execution monitors? We
believe that the answer to this question depends on the relative net-
work speed assumed in the formal operational semantics. (3) Using
brokers as protection domains (§6.2.3) allows us to impose access
control over the senders and receivers of messages. Yet one may
want to also restrict the contents of the messages being sent. How
content-based access control can be imposed on messages passing
through network links in a manner efficient enough to meet the
throughput demand of IoT applications is a technical challenge.
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